Brisbane 2032: Why PPPs should be part of the Olympic infrastructure playbook
Executive summary
Queensland faces a once-in-a-generation opportunity—and challenge—in delivering the infrastructure for the Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games. While the government has public funding available to cover the current forecast costs, it is almost inevitable that a funding shortfall will arise as the true cost of delivering the required infrastructure becomes clear. Additional funding sources will almost certainly be needed. Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) offer a proven model to not only mobilise private capital, but also share delivery risk and embed whole-of-life thinking into projects. This article explores why PPPs should be part of the strategy, identifies the best candidate projects for PPP delivery, and outlines practical steps for GICCA and the Queensland Government to act now.
The funding challenge
The Queensland Government’s 2032 Delivery Plan sets out an ambitious program of venues, athlete villages, and transport upgrades. The capital cost is significant—currently estimated at $7.1 billion for venues. History suggests that the final cost will almost certainly be higher. This investment will also coincide with the Queensland Government’s $116.8 billion capital infrastructure pipeline over the next 4 years.
The question is not whether Queensland (with financial assistance from the Commonwealth Government) can fund and deliver the infrastructure—it can. The question is how to do so without overburdening public finances and while maintaining quality, timeliness, and long-term legacy value. This is where PPPs come in.
PPPs explained: Two key models
PPPs are not a single structure but a family of models. For Brisbane 2032, two basic forms require consideration:
1. Service Payment PPPs
How they work: A privately owned entity (PPP Co) designs, builds, finances, and maintains the asset. Government makes monthly service payments once the facility is available and meets performance standards.
Finance: PPP Co raises debt and equity to finance construction. Government indirectly repays this finance through the monthly service payments.
Risk allocation: Delays to completion defer commencement of the monthly service payments, and poor operating performance reduces them, creating strong incentives for timely delivery and quality.
Cost: Service payment PPPs do not expand the funding available to repay the finance—the service payment is wholly sourced from government funding. The financing cost is higher than direct government borrowing, but benefits include:
the risk buffer that private capital provides against contractor insolvency and default; and
financial discipline from private capital at risk.
2. User-Charge PPPs
How they work: PPP Co collects and retains revenues from users. For sporting facilities and multi-use arenas, operating revenues can include ticket sales, parking, advertising, naming rights, food and beverage (retail and corporate hospitality). For athlete villages, revenue can be generated from the subsequent post-Games development of the land and airspace.
Funding benefit: This model expands funding beyond government funding, reducing reliance on taxpayer dollars. Governments can, of course, similarly access these funding sources by applying user charges to a publicly funded facility, but they often do so less effectively than the private sector.
Risk: Revenue shortfalls are borne by PPP Co, not government, unless minimum revenue guarantees are provided.
Both models can be combined with value capture mechanisms—to capture a slice of the property value uplift that occurs in the vicinity of the new infrastructure, which can contribute to the funding task.
Why PPPs make sense for Brisbane 2032
PPPs are not just about finance. They deliver strategic benefits that align perfectly with Olympic infrastructure needs:
Timely delivery incentives: Services payment and/or user-charge structures motivate on-time completion—critical for a fixed-date event.
Superior cost and time performance: Past studies (e.g., Duffield 2008) indicate that PPP contracts deliver better time and cost outcomes than traditional models, largely due to the financial discipline that private capital brings to a project.
Whole-of-Life thinking: PPPs embed lifecycle cost efficiency and will ensure post-Games legacy transition is planned upfront.
Shared owner responsibility: The Queensland Government’s capacity to act as a capable owner across dozens of projects will be stretched in the lead-up to 2032. PPPs enable government to share the capable owner responsibilities with private sector equity investors who bring delivery, asset management and governance capability.
Financial rigour: Equity investors and lenders scrutinise cost, program, revenue and performance assumptions, reducing optimism bias.
Risk buffer: PPP structures provide the government with a buffer against the risk of contractor insolvency and default—not by eliminating risk, but by incentivising equity investors and lenders to intervene early to protect their investment.
Addressing common concerns
Procurement timeframes: While PPP procurements take longer, there is still sufficient time if GICCA acts now and streamlines bidding processes.
Market capacity: Australia’s PPP market is deep but finite. Sequencing tenders, harmonising contract terms, and minimising bespoke requirements will be essential to attract sufficient bidding interest.
Why Government should retain demand risk
Demand risk—the risk that venues attract fewer events or patrons than forecast—is best retained by government. Why?
Government influence: The State is uniquely positioned to attract major events through policy, marketing, and tourism strategies.
Economic benefits: The broader economic uplift from events—tourism, hospitality, jobs—flows to government and the community, not just the venue operator.
Investor appetite: Private investors are reluctant to take demand risk for Olympic venues, given uncertainty post-Games. Retaining or sharing this risk will ensure competitive bidding and lower financing costs.
But lower-risk operating revenues (perhaps with a minimum revenue guarantee) could potentially provide PPP Co with a user-charge revenue stream,
PPPs and fair risk allocation
PPPs need not be adversarial or involve unfair risk transfer. Modern PPPs can embrace collaborative contracting concepts. Examples include:
Alliance PPPs: Combining private finance with alliance contracting principles—shared risk/reward, joint governance.
Progressive PPPs: Government shortlists a preferred consortium based on capability early in the project development phase, then finalises scope, program and price through negotiation and/or segmented market testing rather than ‘two-to-the-wire’ PPP bids. This reduces bid costs and redirects resources to collaborative innovation.
These models are gaining traction globally and could be adapted for Brisbane 2032.
Global and local precedents
London 2012: Used PPPs for transport upgrades and athlete villages.
Paris 2024: PPPs for major venues and housing.
Sydney 2000: PPPs for the main stadium, multi-use arena and athletes’ village (now Newington).
Perth Stadium (Optus Stadium): Delivered as a DBFM PPP, with operations contracted separately. A strong precedent for Brisbane’s main stadium.
Best candidates for PPP delivery
Not all projects suit PPPs. The best candidates share these features:
Greenfield (new build, not refurbishment).
Significant capital cost (to justify transaction costs).
Long-term maintenance needs.
Potential user-charge revenue streams.
Measurable outputs.
Projects where post-Games configuration can be locked in at contractual close.
Assets attractive to investors, contractors and consultants (including Games-period profile).
Top contenders
Main Brisbane Stadium (Victoria Park)
Capital cost: $3.8 billion.
Structure: A DBFM structure would see PPP Co design, build, finance and maintain the asset, with operations either bundled (DBFOM) or separately contracted, as at Perth’s Optus Stadium.
Why PPP works: Showpiece venue, kudos for investors and contractors, clear performance metrics; significant capital cost; stand-alone project.
Demand risk: Best retained by government, as it is best placed to attract major events to the State and to capture the associated economic benefits
Revenue: PPP Co’s revenue stream to comprise:
government capital contribution;
performance-based service payment;
operating revenue (excluding ticket sales) from carparking, advertising, naming rights, food and beverage (retail and corporate hospitality).
Government retains major event ticketing revenue. The Government may need to guarantee a minimum number of events and patronage each year (to underpin the operator’s user-based operating revenue stream).
Athletes’ Villages
Locations: Bowen Hills, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast.
Why PPP works: Proven model (Smith Collective, London 2012, Paris 2024). Large capital cost and post-Games development opportunity.
Structure: PPP Co delivers Olympic accommodation, then redevelops site for housing/community use. Government could mandate suitable social and affordable housing outcomes
Revenue: Availability payments during Games; development profits post-Games.
National Aquatic Centre
Capital cost: Perhaps $1.2 billion.
Why PPP works: Lifecycle-heavy asset; measurable performance (water quality, facility readiness).
Legacy and lifecycle: 25,000 seats required for Game, but only 8000 thereafter. Significant long-term O&M costs, with ongoing maintenance of pools, filtration equipment and mechanical plant. A PPP partner will bring efficiency and risk management to lifecycle costs.
Payments/Revenue:
Service payment: Government pays service payment based on facility availability, performance (water quality, facility readiness).
Community Usage / Legacy Revenue: The O&M subcontractor (or PPP Co) could retain or share revenue from community swimming, training, membership, hire, etc.
Major Event Revenue Share / Commercial Upside: For big competitions, ticketing and event revenues could be split or shared, giving PPP Co upside for elite events. Government to guarantee minimum revenue amount for PPP Co.
The Wave (Transport Project)
Scope: Heavy rail Beerwah–Birtinya with new stations; metro-style bus corridor from Birtinya through Maroochydore to Sunshine Coast Airport; Mooloolah River Interchange Upgrade.
Why PPP works: TOD integration can subsidize rail costs; availability payment model for core rail infrastructure.
Value capture: Opportunities exist around new stations.
Gold Coast Arena
Already proposed as DBFOM—ideal PPP candidate.
Projects not suited to PPPs
A PPP model is not suitable for all 2032 Delivery Plan projects. Refurbishments, temporary facilities, lower-value community assets and projects requiring rapid scope flexibility are better delivered through publicly funded delivery models.
Market readiness
Australia’s PPP market is experienced, but capacity is finite. To ensure success:
Streamline procurement: Harmonise contracts, minimise bespoke requirements.
Sequence tenders: Avoid overwhelming bidders.
Scale up GICCA capability: PPP expertise will be critical.
Done well, this creates a repeatable pipeline that the market can resource.
Closing argument
Brisbane 2032 is a golden opportunity to showcase Queensland’s infrastructure capability. PPPs are not a silver bullet, but they are a strategic tool for high-value, complex projects. They mobilise private capital, embed lifecycle thinking, and share risk in ways traditional delivery cannot.
The time to act is now — before fiscal pressure, market congestion and delivery risk leave fewer, and poorer, choices. GICCA and the Queensland Government should identify PPP candidates, engage with the market, and embed PPPs in the 2032 Delivery Plan. Doing so will ensure Queensland delivers world-class infrastructure—on time, on budget, and fit for post-Games legacy purposes.
This article is based on an exam question I set for Melbourne University’s Master of Laws course on PPPs. Some of the suggestions come from students.
